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This article explores Giorgio Agamben!s celebrated “double paradigm of sovereignty”,
which introduces the Christian idea of oikonomia (“economy”) as a foundational polit-
ical concept in Western thinking. It argues that Agamben!s far-ranging discussion im-
proves our understanding of how Foucault!s notion of biopower actually develops his-
torically from the matrix of early Christian theology and how it becomes its own kind of
“political theology” to undergird the contemporary dynamics, structure, and rhetoric of
neoliberalism. Following Agamben, the argument also builds on his thesis that “eco-
nomic sovereignty” today is cemented through the power of modern forms of media in
much the sameway that the critical theorists of the interwar period identified the “culture
industry” as the genuine hegemon of capitalism. Finally, it devotes extensive attention to
the work of the French social philosopher and media theorist Bernard Stiegler and his
notion of “cognitive capitalism.”
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Introduction
The aim of this essay is to demonstrate how Giorgio Agamben!s third volume of
his critical trilogy on the concept of sovereignty entitled The Kingdom and the
Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government can be read as
framework for a new theory of global neoliberalism as “cognitive capitalism.”1 In
just the last few years a number of significant books and articles have appeared
both criticizing and expanding on Agamben!s argument in The Kingdom and the
1 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of
Economy andGovernment, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa andMatteoMandarini (Stanford CA:
Stanford University Press, Kindle Edition, 2011).
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Glory, while attempting to use his thesis to perform some sort of “genealogy” of
the present day international order to which scholars have attached the label of
“neoliberalism.” The most important of these works is Dotan Leshem!s The
Origin of Neoliberalism: Modelling the Economy from Jesus to Foucault, a mas-
sive and extremely detailed historical investigation of Patristic theology and po-
litical theory in lateRoman antiquity, which serves both to fill out and revisemany
of Agamben!s speculations.2 Of course, the book only deals with the “origin” of
neoliberalism in the first five or six centuries of theChristian era and offers no real
new insights on Foucault!s own contributions.A secondwork, which focusesmore
on the relationship between theological constructs and the development of early
financial instruments, is Devin Singh!s Divine Currency: The Theological Power
of Money in the West.3 Singh!s volume combines much of the Patristic literature
treated by Leshem, but delves more assiduously into the kinds of innovative
hypotheticals advanced by Philip Goodchild in his highly influential Theology of
Money.4
But these strictly theological genealogies of “neoliberalism” do not give us
anywhere near the full picture. In addition, the presumed linkage between Pat-
ristic thought andmodern political economy is more a highly suggestive historical
analogy for which the prestige ofAgamben has set a scholarly brushfire than it is a
useful map for conceptualizing the present day phenomenon. Rather than pre-
occupying ourselves with Agamben!s notion of “economy,” as the afore-
mentioned researchers have done, we will instead inquire in this essay into the
former!s theory of “glory” as the secret of the present regime of virtualized po-
litical economy.
We will show through a close reading of such eminent theorists as Wendy
Brown, Bernard Stiegler, and of course the Marxist tradition overall how the
distinguishing feature of the relatively untheorized bogeyman of progressive
politics regularly branded as “neoliberalism” is not simply capitalism gone wild.
Nor is it somehow, as a number of scholars have fancifully and polemically con-
jectured, the inexorable millennia-long outgrowth of Western Christianity. So-
called neoliberal “rationality” has far more to do with the development of a
twenty-first century symbolic economy – a global emporium of exchange built on
significations and simulacra rather than surplusmateriality or expropriated labor.
It is this “mediatized” form of economic value that uniquely serves as the latter
day architectonic for neoliberalism, which is a polity, a culture, an economy, and a
structure of representation all rolled into one. Neoliberalism today has by its own
internal syllogistics been the prime mover for the current “crisis of representa-
2 DotanLeshem,TheOrigins ofNeoliberalism:Modelling the Economy from Jesus to
Foucault (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).
3 Devin Singh / Divine Currency, The Theological Power of Money in the West
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2018).
4 Philip Goodchild, Theology of Money (DurhamNC: Duke University Press, 2009).
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tion”, and we must do more than merely concentrate on the problem of markets
and the fungibility of goods and services through historical exchangemechanisms
to decipher the crisis itself.
If I may badly paraphrase Jesus, “markets you will always have with you.” The
dark bodings of the present neoliberal moment are to the injustice of markets
what Genghis Khan was to the petty corruptions of local Byzantine officials. A
much more profound and consequential set of issues are currently at stake.
1. The Trinitarian Watershed
In the The Kingdom and the Glory Agamben lays out in the opening sentence a
project that will take Foucault!s theory of “governmentality” to a new level. “This
study,” he writes, “will inquire into the paths by which and the reasons why power
in the West has assumed the form of an oikonomia.” It “locates” itself within the
ongoing genealogical investigations that Foucault initiated in the 1970s,Agamben
says, “but, at the same time, it also aims to understand the internal reasons why
they failed to be completed.” Foucault was unable, Agamben suggests, to ac-
knowledge “the shadow that the theoretical interrogation of the present casts
onto the past reaches well beyond the chronological limits that Foucault causes, as
if amore primordial genetic rankwould necessarily pertain to theology.” In fact, it
can be traced all the way back, according to Agamben, to the very “onto-theo-
logical” template for all Western thought itself, the three-in-one Godhead.
Agamben announces in his opening statement that he aims to go beyond
Foucault!s fixation on the clerico-confessional management of both the language
and psychology of salvation compressed into the latter!s notion of the “pastorate,”
which becomes the groundwork for the theory of “biopolitics”. He argues that he
wants to “show instead how the apparatus of the Trinitarian oikonomia may
constitute a privileged laboratory for the observation of the working and articu-
lation – both internal and external – of the governmental machine. For within this
apparatus the elements – or the polarities – that articulate the machine appear, as
it were, in their paradigmatic form.”Agamben proposes a few sentences later that
the question of oikonomia, which means of course “household” in Greek and
from which we derive both of the terms economy and ecology, is ultimately about
the essence of “power” in theWestern context. Themetaphysics of “economy” is,
in crucial but somewhat opaque respects, pairedwith the seemingly “antinomical”
(Agamben!s term) construct of “sovereignty” in the absolute sense that Carl
Schmitt analyzed in the 1920s. “The double structure of the governmental ma-
chine, which in State of Exception (2003) appeared in the correlation between
auctoritas and potestas, here takes the form of the articulation between Kingdom
and Government and, ultimately, interrogates the very relation – which initially
was not considered – between oikonomia and Glory, between power as govern-
ment and effective management, and power as ceremonial and liturgical regality,
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two aspects that have been curiously neglected by both political philosophers and
political scientists.”5
For Agamben, both Schmitt and Foucault serve as the double axis today, much
likeKant andHegel in the nineteenth century, for an investigation of the political.
In addition, the analysis of the political is impossible without consideration of its
embedded theological substrata, a famous argumentwhichCarl Schmitt advanced
almost a century ago, but which has only been applied for all intents and purposes
(as Agamben points out) heretofore to the notion of exceptionality (Ausnah-
mezustand) without due regard for the increasingly relevant concept of pro-
portionality. This question, which perhaps amounts to a Derridean aporia or
“undecidable”, harks all the way back to Plato and the beginnings of Western
philosophy in itself. It also trenches on the question in early Christianity of the
significance of “law”, or nomos, within the larger scheme of what the Greeks
named dikaiosyne, or “justice”. Is the law strictly situational (i. e., does it apply
only, as Paul asked, to those who like the Jews are “under the law”), or is it truly
“universal” in the way that Kant!s “practical reason” later formulated it (i. e. ,
valid for all persons from all cultures and polities at all times in the same set of
circumstances)?
Simply stated, is “justice” ultimately retributive or distributive?And who can,
or should, administer it? If justice is founded merely on sovereign, or divine,
decree, then the appropriate “political” configuration is doubtlessly autocracy. If
justice is all about ratio, or proportional allotment (Simonides! “rendering to each
person his due”)6, then it must subject to what contemporary theoreticians would
term “administrative” or “managerial” reason – in other words, the logic of bu-
reaucracy and the subtle play within the biopolitical venue of “power” alongside
“knowledge”, as Foucault understood it.7 The latter would also be the prevailing
semiotic coding mechanism for present day democracies. How does one, there-
fore, assess real, as opposed to imagined, power in accordance with the paradigm
of “governmentality” that Foucault initially sketched out?Andwhatwould be the
theological episteme, as Foucault might call it, within which this process unfolds?
Agamben notably argues that the paradigms of both sovereignty and oiko-
nomia derive straightaway from “Christian theology” – on the one hand, a “po-
litical theology, which founds the transcendence of sovereign power on the single
God,” and on the other hand, an “economic theology, replacing this tran-
scendence with the idea of an oikonomia, conceived as an immanent ordering –
domestic and not political in a strict sense – of both divine and human life.”8 The
theological provenance of both transcendent sovereignty and an “immanent or-
5 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, loc. 113–119.
6 Plato, Republic, 331(e).
7 See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews And Other Writings
(New York: Vintage, 1980).
8 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, loc. 150–156.
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dering” is the Trinitarian formulation at Nicea. Trinitarianism historically can be
seen as a compromise to reconcile the Caesaro-papal instincts of Christianity!s
new imperial benefactor Constantine, who sought to unify the empire under one
common faith, with the “pastoral” apparatus that the underground and previously
persecuted church had already achieved with its remarkable, organizational
prowess over nearly three centuries. The Trinitarian formula was also a sophis-
ticated outworking in both a political and philosophical context of the inherent
“incarnational” synthesis of pagan and Jewish thought brilliantly articulated from
50 to approximately 65 A.D. by the apostle Paul. Apart from such a synthesis,
Christianity would not only have failed to develop over time, especially after the
debacle of the Jewish War in 70 A.D. It would also have proved inadequate as a
true “state religion” designed to hold the fractious and centrifugal forces of a
decaying Roman empire together, a project which a successive caesars prior to
Constantine had unsuccessfully attempted under the guise of an innovative form
of unitary “solar monothesism”.9The prestige of the militarized Roman state had
already been in decline since the disasters on the frontiers a century earlier.
Hence, Constantine needed a new, religio-symbolic order that embraced the pi-
eties of the already sprawling and largely literate clerical classes, which were
heavily populated by Christians. The Christianity of antiquity from the outset was
what Foucault terms “governmental”, and it came to be secularized, especially in
the France of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well as Prussia during
the nineteenth century, which invented through theministrations of the Lutheran
Landeskirchewhat has come to be known as “state socialism”.Genealogically, the
Prussian prototype of a secularized clerical state governance centered on the
university and its “faculties” along with the military and a cartelized financial
system dating all the way back to theMiddleAges was the seedbed for the growth
of what currently we recognized as larger “neoliberal” order, not to mention
Bernard Stiegler!s “cognitive capitalism” or Peter Drucker!s “knowledge soci-
ety.”
2. From Oikonomia to Biopolitics
So far as Agamben is concerned, the “biopolitical” administration of the world is
authorized by the idea that the divine is, in effect, a triple functionary, as first
enunciated per scholarly consensus by the church father Irenaeus of Lyon in the
latter half of the second century with his claim that the Godhead is one in reality,
butmanifests through three different functions, or operations.10Whereas Irenaeus
9 See James B. Rives,Religion in the Roman Empire (Hoboken NJ:Wiley-Blackwell,
2006) as well as Andrew Cain, The Power of Religion in Late Antiquity (New York:
Routledge, 2009).
10 Jackson J. Lashier, however, in his close reading of Irenaeus! works suggest that
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understands the “economic” administration of the Triune God to entail the work
of the Son as well as the Father and the Spirit, Agamben is concerned mainly with
the first and third persons of the Trinity. But what makes oikonomia unique,
according toAgamben, is that itmirrors not the sphere of sovereignty that informs
the politeia (that is, “the political”) but the household. Broadly conceived, oiko-
nomia in the Aristotelian setting has only to do with the conduct of personal or
family affairs – dealings between master and slave, father and children, husband
and wife – which are completely set apart from, and impenetrable by, the polis.
Whereas in the modern “republican”, or bourgeois, setting the household would
be regarded as a kind of monadic prototype for civil society – and in Hegel!s
“philosophy of right” for the rationality of the state tout court – it would para-
doxically in theAthenian environment be envisioned as the very penumbra of the
political. Howwould, therefore, the “economic”model of human relationships be
gradually given separate, but importance with “despotic” sovereignty? The result
would be a Christian “political theology” that would ultimately leave its un-
mistakable “signature”, as Agamben puts it, on the modern secular order, while
perhaps becoming what Schmitt in his later work would describe as the “nomos of
the earth”?
It is a commonplace among historians that the Christian ekklesia evolved
during and throughout the pre-Constantian era as a kind of shadow state, pur-
posed for the general “care of souls”, filling an enormous social as well as spiritual
vacuum which the militarized and overly politicized imperium was completely
derelict in executing. The role of the Christian pastorate, therefore, became its
own kind of Aristotelian “household” writ large and inscribed, despite the re-
current antagonism of the imperial authorities, within the “cosmopolitan” ex-
panse of an increasingly unwieldy – and ungovernable – empire. After the
“conversion” of Constantine, the dialectics throughout the Mediterranean world
of polis versus oikonimia resulted in an unparalleled moment of Aufhebung,
which still persists into the present.
At the same time, if “politics” and “economics” are now separate, yet theo-
retically inseparable, in the guise of what we have come to call “political econo-
my”, and if these two modalities of “administration” have been fused ever since
the age of Constantine by a dominant political theology of both God and gov-
ernment as necessarily sovereign, yet simultaneously “caring” and concerned for
the general welfare, what does that portend for the present and evolving “glob-
alist” configuration of polities and peoples, one in which once independent eth-
nicities, the pith of national sovereignty ever since the seventeenth century, have
been replaced with the new transnational empire of fluid markets and nomadic
Irenaeus was not the first to articulate an “economic”model, but drew on various threads
of commentary from an earlier generation of Christian apologists. See Jackson J. Lashier,
The Trinitarian Theology of Irenaeus of Lyons, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Mar-
quette University, May 2011.
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capital? This new empire is no longer defined by disciplinary structures of he-
gemony and authority as much as by the swarming and “sliding” signifiers (in
Lacan!s sense) that constitute digital communications and the infinitely rarified
specimens of financial transactivity? Such indicators, following the academic
conventions of the last decade or so, delineatemuchofwhat has come to be known
as “neoliberalism.” And the new planetary regime that carries its name has come
to be investedwith a certain disrepute, even among thosewho are visibly aswell as
invisibly its agents of influence and benefactors.
At a very superficial level, this new global demesne of etherealized capital,
which as we have seen derives its power from the pseudo-ethical imperative of a
“socially conscious” consumerism that will “save the planet”, resembles the an-
cient ideal of Romanitas. Such an ideal can be summed up simply as collection of
higher “humanist” values on which citizens of the empire relied in order to justify
morally and culturally their brutal subjugation of the far-flung multitudes. It was
similar to the British colonizer!s fiction of their “civilizing mission” throughout
the nineteenth century. But this kind of “humanism,” which the Romans in-
variably contrasted with the pervasive “barbarism” which they were convinced
had to be conquered and pushed back from its borders, was ultimately inadequate
to keep the empire together. It inexorably fell prey to a kind of regional war-
lordism stoked by the increasing reliance of the regime on non-citizens, or what
today we would describe as “stateless” mercenaries, to maintain peace and order
amidst a widely dysfunctional political, as well as steadily collapsing economic,
system.
What the Christian oikonomia provided was a different form of governance
akin to what today we would call “soft power” through the mediation of a com-
pelling new symbolic ensemble of instrumentalities. In Agamben!s view the
power wielded by the “pastorate” in this new clerical economy derives from what
he calls a politics of “glory.” Such a politics is immanently inscribed within the
social order to the extent that it encompasses the entirety of those who are not
mere subjects, but also thosewho are claimed by, or theorized as coming under the
authority, of the lordly realm. The Medieval legal figment of a “Holy Roman
empire” could not have been elaborated over the centuries without this curious
sort of pastoral postulate. In Roman times this privilege of invoking such a prin-
ciple was accorded only to the narrow circle of those holding “citizenship”. But
the early church rendered it “transcendental” in the sense that it promoted a novel
style of “subjectivity” through baptism into, and participation within, the body of
Christ. In other words, because of the pastoral postulate Christians were con-
stituted as more than simply political subjects. They were incorporated soterio-
logically, rather than strictly civically, into a “kingdom not of this world.”
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3. The Instrumentality of Glory and the Origins of a Symbolic
Economy
Augustine, writing during the decades of imperial prostration in the early fifth
century, first laid out the general theory of such dual subjecthood in his City of
God. But while he, like Paul, looked for the reconciliation of these “two king-
doms” only at the moment of an eschatological finale, his ecclesiastical imagi-
nation laid the groundwork for the revival of the Constantinian synthesis during
the highMiddleAges and eventually for the rise of a novumordo seclorumn in the
late modern period. The question of “glory” as “the uncertain zone in which
acclamations, ceremonies, liturgies, and insignia operate”, for Agamben, came to
be transposed from the sacerdotal to the symbology of secular politics overall.11
Agamben writes: “glory is the place where theology attempts to think the
difficult conciliation between immanent trinity and economic trinity, theologia
and oikonomia, being and praxis, God in himself and God for us. For this reason,
the doxology, despite its apparent ceremonial fixity, is the most dialectical part of
theology, in which what can only be thought of as separate must attain unity.”12
The instrumentality of “glory,” which was used routinely by both kings and clergy
up until early twentieth century and became the flash point for the kind of sec-
tarian conflict that eventually morphed into anti-clerical political revolutions,
served as the precursor, according to Agamben, for the aestheticization of mass
politics that found its most demonic expression in the various totalitarianisms of
the twentieth century. “We find here, as we find at the hidden root of all aesthe-
ticisms,”Agamben notes, “the need to cover and dignify what is in itself pure force
and domination”.13 But this “aesthetic” subterfuge can also be understood in
terms of the virtualization of politics through both earlier and later forms ofmedia
and the manipulation of what once were material interests through the idealizing
mechanisms of a “symbolic economies,” about which I have written in my book
Force of God.14
The idea of a purely symbolic economy was advanced during the 1970s by a
lesser knownFrench post-structuralist theorist named Jean-JosephGoux, roughly
about the same time as Foucault began his decade of lectures at the College de
France. It is Goux!s overarching approach, adapted from Marx!s analysis of the
fetishism of commodities in Book I of Capital as the generative principle in the
formation of surplus value, that helps us frame a broader theory of neoliberalism
as global governance bypurely semiotic operators.These operators, or “signifiers”,
are not so much a cover for “pure force and domination” as they are they are the
11 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, loc. 3917.
12 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, loc. 4316.
13 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, loc. 4385.
14 See Carl Raschke, Force of God (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015),
especially pp. 73–77.
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force of domination itself. Goux relies on Marx!s observations about how com-
modification serves as an anticipation of the ultimate epiphany of alienated labor
under the aspect of money. Political economy, not only forMarx but for a number
of his predecessors, comes down to the issue of how value is created. In Marx!s
final analysis, such value constitutes different transmutations, or “crystal-
lizations”, of labor as commodities, culminating in their “dazzling money form.”15
Commodification progresses through the increasingly obscure alchemy of the
market exchange mechanism. In order for commodities to be exchanged, their
“values” must be compared by some kind of rational set of criteria. But the
commodities themselves cannot serve as a basis of comparison. Their values are
merely “relative” to each other.
Thus theremust emerge a general principle for comparing the relative values of
commodities, a “value of values”, so to speak, or what political economy desig-
nates as a “general equivalent”. The brandishing of the general equivalent re-
quires that we excise the value of the labor that went into making it, yielding a
more recondite form of value containing nothing more than “abstract labor.”
Marxwrites that “the body of the commodity that serves as the equivalent, figures
as the materialisation of human labour in the abstract, and is at the same time the
product of some specifically useful concrete labour.”16 The money form of the
commodity becomes the very prima materia for the accumulation of “surplus”
labor value (Mehrwert) from which all historical variants of “capitalism” spring.
The general equivalent, or the “money form,” thereby becomes the sorcerer!s
apprentice that sets in motion an endless procession of formal correlations
(“simulacra,” as Jean Baudrillard calls them), converting material inputs into
immaterial regalia. This “virtualization” of concrete value through commodity
production, especially in themoney form, is also the occasion for class conflict and
exploitation, so far as Marx is concerned.
Marx, of course, in his fidelity to Hegelian dialectics believed that this process
over timewould bring about the ripening ofmultiple, inherent “contradictions” in
the system, leading to its eventual breakdown and the onset of revolution. But
what Marx did not foresee was the way in which the virtualization process itself,
including what Maurizzio Lazzarato terms “immaterial labor”, could be further
virtualized and consequently commodified, bringing into being the brave new
world of today where “knowledge” is not a simple condition for the manufacture
of usable “things,” but a thing to be produced and valued for itself, which is what
we really have in mind when we prattle on about “knowledge workers” and the
“knowledge society.”17
15 Karl Marx, Capital, Book 1, 6.
16 Marx, Capital, Book 1, 11.
17 Lazzaratowrites: “The #great transformation! that began at the start of the 1970s has
changed the very terms in which the question is posed. Manual labor is increasingly
coming to involve procedures that could be defined as #intellectual,! and the new com-
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Goux explains how this kind of transformation takes place: “instead of the
relation, in which symbolicity is constituted; instead of exchange, through which
subjects, in partially reversible fabric, canmetabolize the signifiers that constitute
them – the symbolic freezes into a rigid mediation that dominates them. Fur-
thermore, if the symbolic relations introduces a third entity, a mediating element,
by which the ceaseless floods of the imaginary are absorbed … a symbolic
counteraction, operating like a forced currency, blocks the balancing process and
dispossess subjects of their own activity, through the symbolic functions of the
state,money, the concept.”18Thus the contemporary “crisis of representation” can
be understood as fundamental to the very translation of politeia into oikonomia,
or at least the beginning of a recognition that they are interchangeable somehow
at an ontological level. The introduction of the primordial intuition of value as
“exchange value”, which defines the “economic” paradigm as a whole, demands
this shift in our perception.
4. The Neoliberal Moment
Nevertheless, it is not only money that presents itself as the new face of tyranny in
serving to “dispossess” subjects of what is properly their own through the appa-
ratus of symbolization, virtualization, and de-materialization. If the virtualization
of finance had a lot to do, as most analysts agree, with the Great Recession that
started in the fall of 2008, the digitization and proliferation of personalized media
has been a driving force in the degeneration of politics into low-grade civil war.
Standard critiques of neoliberalism, especially since the instant media sensation
that came to be known as theOccupymovement in September 2011, have focused
on the heightened maldistribution of wealth and traced the current malaise to a
revival of a predatory capitalism not seen since the 1890s. But amore recent wave
munications technologies increasingly require subjectivities that are rich in knowledge. It
is not simply that intellectual labor has become subjected to the norms of capitalist
production. What has happened is that a new #mass intellectuality! has come into being,
created out of a combination of the demands of capitalist production and the forms of
#self-valorization! that the struggle against work has produced. The old dichotomy be-
tween #mental andmanual labor,! or between #material labor and immaterial labor,! risks
failing to grasp the newnature of productive activity, which takes this separation on board
and transforms it. The split between conception and execution, between labor and cre-
ativity, between author and audience, is simultaneously transcended within the !labor
process! and reimposed as political command within the #process of valorization.!”
Maurizio Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labor”, in: Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Pol-
itics, ed. Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota
Press, 2006), 133.
18 Jean-Joseph Goux, Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud (Ithaca, NY: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1990), 163.
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of literature has focused on the hegemonyof the symbolic economy itself.Many of
thesewriters have drawn attention to the co-dependency of such an economywith
what we might term consumptive consumerism.Wendy Brown, perhaps foremost
among such theorists, characterizes the way in which these symbolic economies
expropriate not only a person!s labor, but their very value and self-worth. They
force us to become “entrepreneurs of the self”, an expression coined by Foucault
whichBrown leverages extensively in her argument that neoliberalism transforms
everything into capital, especially the kind of “personal capital” that thoroughly
reconstitutes individual self-worth as professional identity in keepingwith socially
enforced criteria of symbolic comparison. Brown writes:
“The figure of the human as an ensemble of entrepreneurial and investment capital is
evident on every college and job application, every package of study strategies, every
exercise, every new diet and exercise program. The best university scholars are charac-
terized as entrepreneurial and investment savvy, not simply by obtaining grants or fel-
lowships, but by generating new projects and publications from old research, calculating
publication and presentation venues, and circulating themselves and their work ac-
cording to what will advance their value.”19
At the same time, what these strategies of both cultural and economic analysis,
which prove to be intimately intertwined when it comes to the critique of neo-
liberalism, tend to miss is the determinative role of media. As the pioneers of
critical theory within the so-called Frankfurt School during the first half of the
twentieth century realized, the “holy alliance” of culture and capital, which
achieves its Gramscian-style synthesis in the evolving figurations of social control
through not only mass media platforms but also individualized digital commu-
nication, is the real darkmatter that needs to be illuminated by the light of reason.
The politics of mediatization need to be reviewed in light of the mediatization of
politics, and that is where Agamben!s claim that modern communications pro-
vides an aura of “glory” for democratic politics, where pomp and pageantry no
longer suffice, turns out to be suggestive, even while it remains rather obscure.
According to Agamben, Schmitt!s rule that politics rests on a monarchial decla-
ration of sovereignty – or at least a constant condition of inimicality (the “friend/
enemy distinction”) analogous to the state of exception – only works within an
autocratic setting.
Rousseau!s notion that sovereignty in a formal sense can also be engraved
within the demos is not necessarily compatible with Schmitt!s deduction of po-
litical power. Likewise, Rousseau!s contention that democratic sovereignty has a
historical warrant, insofar as it invokes contraHobbes a certain commensurability
of the political with life the state of nature (“man is born free, but everywhere he is
19 WendyBrown,Undoing theDemos: Neoliberalism!s Stealth Revolution (NewYork:
Zone Books, 2015), 36–37.
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in chains”), presses us toward accepting the “economic” model of governance.
Such a move is consistent with the kind of providential calculus concerning the
rise and fall of human societies implied in Adam Smith!s metaphor of the “in-
visible hand”, and it constitutes an epochal shift in the rudimentary representation
of “political economy” as a whole.
Agamben perhaps takes Rousseau further than he would have otherwise been
willing to go. One of the essential tensions in the eighteenth century theory of the
social contract turns out to be tug-of-war between the ideal of collective cohesion
founded in the “general will” and the need for some kind of transcendental le-
gitimation of democratic sovereignty. With the latter goal in mind, Rousseau
came up with the heuristics of a “civil religion.” Rousseau!s formulation of such a
civil religion can be found toward the close of The Social Contract: “there is
therefore a purely civil profession of faith of which the Sovereign should fix the
articles, not exactly as religious dogmas, but as social sentiments without which a
man cannot be a good citizen or a faithful subject.”20 These “social sentiments”
can only be buttressed by theweight of the symbolic. The potency of the symbolic,
or what Agamben terms “glory”, has its avatars in the era of democratic egali-
tarianism with what Guy Debord famously named the “society of the spectacle.”
Agamben writes that:
“If we link Debord!s analysis with Schmitt!s thesis according to which public opinion is
the modern form of acclamation, the entire problem of the contemporary spectacle of
media domination over all areas of social life assumes a new over all areas of social life
assumes a new guise. What is in question is nothing less than a new and unheard of
concentration, multiplication, and dissemination of the function of glory as the center of
the political system. What was confined to the spheres of liturgy and ceremonials has
become concentrated in the media and, at the same time, through them it spreads and
penetrates at each moment into every area of society, both public and private. Con-
temporary democracy is a democracy that is entirely founded upon glory, that is, on the
efficacy of acclamation, multiplied and disseminated by the media beyond all imagi-
nation. (That the Greek term for glory – doxa – is the same term that today designates
public opinion is, from this standpoint, something more than a coincidence.) As had
always been the case in profane and ecclesiastical liturgies, this supposedly “originary
democratic phenomenon” is once again caught, orientated, andmanipulated in the forms
and according to the strategies of spectacular power.”21
It is not entirely clearwhatAgamben has inmindwith this analogywith the phrase
“efficacy of acclamation.” The analogy with regal pomp and circumstance implies
that the media somehow manages only to lionize, and thereby legitimate, the
20 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, TheWorks of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract,
Confessions, Emile, and Other Essays (Baltimore MD: Common Knowledge Publishers,
2004), Kindle Edition, loc. 1592–1596.
21 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, loc. 5288–98.
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formation of sovereignty within the modern demos. However, it becomes im-
mediately apparent, once we read just a little further in this concluding reflection
of Agamben!s The Kingdom and the Glory, which admittedly is not as developed
or well-formed as it should be, that he is alluding to Jürgen Habermas! theory of
“communicative action.” Habermas! recipe for democracy as founded on the
inherent rationality of communicative, or deliberative, power is well-known. As
Habermas declares in Between Facts and Norms (1996), “all political power de-
rives from the communicative power of citizens.”22
Habermas grounds this assertion in what he dubs an “illocutionary” construct
of rationality – something akin to, more “Platonist” in its origins, to what Derrida
came to call the “NewEnlightenment” – “when language is conceived as universal
medium for embodying reason.”23 The maintenance of linguistic coherence as a
“postmodern” version of the classic political logos, resident within the systems or
communicative transaction and symbolic exchange comprising the new cosmo-
politan agora, fosters in our present day “lifeworld” (to invoke Habermas! own
expression) the conditions for both democratic participation and the commitment
of citizens to some form of the “common” or “public” good. For Agamben, this
preservation of Habermas! “knowledge-constitutive interests” through the cul-
tivation of a pluralized, yet intelligible fabric of shared discourse is not, however,
to be established pragmatically through the intervention of the academic dis-
ciplines, especially philosophy. Such a higher, governmental role for “critical
theory” was always the aspiration of the Frankfurt School, and can perhaps be
traced all the way back to Plato!s own call for rule by “philosopher kings.” It can,
at least, be linked to some of the inclinations of Frederick the Great during the
eighteenth century in his dream of a Europe commandeered by “enlightened
despots”. Frederick sought to replace the hegemony of the clergy with that of
professors, an episode in the evolution of the social imaginary that inspired to a
certain degree the founding of the Prussian state system of universal education,
which would indirectly nurture a “virtuous” citizenry.
The “glory” of the democratic and “holistic” state in the view of Agamben is
“founded on the immediate presence of the acclaiming people, and the neutral-
ized state that resolves itself in the communicative forms without subject, are
opposed only in appearance. They are nothing but two sides of the same glorious
apparatus in its two forms: the immediate and subjective glory of the acclaiming
people and the mediatic and objective glory of social communication.”24 Ac-
cording to Agamben, “glory” in this regard demonstrates “its dual aspect, divine
22 Ju¨rgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory
of Law and Democracy, tr. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 170. See
also Jeffrey Flynn, “Communicative Power in Habermas! Theory of Democracy”, in:
European Journal of Political Theory 3(4): 434.
23 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 8.
24 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, loc. 5332.
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and human, ontological and economic, of the Father and the Son.” Following
Habermas! distinction, it can be construed as mediating both “the people-sub-
stance and the people-communication.”25
5. Bernard Stiegler!s New Critique of Political Economy
But what if Agambenwere dead wrong, andwhat if his notion ofmediatic “glory”
has metasized, as we are seeing increasingly nowadays, turned out instead to be
the tawdry?What if this “tawdriness” were in fact the inevitable “cash-out” of the
symbolic economy itself, of an appalling, but spectacular climax to the ongoing
virtualization of both labor and capital in a latter day, gargantuan immolation of
both meaning and signification whereby the “crisis of representation” becomes a
global catastrophe of the political itself? What if the linguistics of “communica-
tive reason” had now morphed as in some kind of insidious mutation of its own
semiotic genomes into a hyperpartisan “hate machine?” How could that even
happen? In order to answer that question, we must begin to pay heed to Bernard
Stiegler!s urgent call for a “new critique of political economy” that understands
the linguistic process in keeping with both Plato!s and Derrida!s reading phar-
makon, as both “poison and remedy.” Stiegler!s brilliant analysis of the problem,
published in 2010 at a time when the current sordid state of politics was lamen-
tably but a small, lowering cloud on the horizon, calls into question the very
sentimental assumptions about the connections between democracy, discourse,
rationality, and mediatic expression, which Agamben together with Habermas
have dangled in front of us. “We thus have pure cognitive labor power utterly
devoid of knowledge with cognitive technologies, Stiegler writes”26. “The cogni-
tive elites” are “deprived of their own logic and by their logic- a logic reduced to a
calculation without remainder as well as to a market of fools.”27
In order to achieve a better grasp of what Stiegler intendswith such a comment,
we need to flesh out his larger perspective. For ACritique of Political Economy
pulls together many of the threads of his extensive, earlier writings to revive a call
for a critique of capitalism in the twenty-first century that takes up from what
Marx left undone in the nineteenth century. Stiegler set forth these remarks in the
immediate wake of the worldwide economic crisis that began in the fall of 2008,
but became manifest in 2009. In the first chapter entitled “Heads Buried in the
Sand: AWarning,” Stiegler makes the case that both the Keynesian “stimulus” to
what was supposed to have engineered recovery from the Great Recession and
the digital automation of industry that is proceeding apace “is the translation of a
25 Ibid.
26 Bernard Stiegler, For ANewCritique of Political Economy, trans. David Ross (New
York: Polity, 2010), 46.
27 Stiegler, For A New Critique of Political Economy, 47.
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moribund ideology, desperately trying to prolong the life of a model which has
become self-destructive.”28 At the same time, Stiegler is not merely advancing
some cheap, hackneyed version of rhetoric against capitalism per se. It is the
distinctive new kind of capitalism – i.e., “cognitive capitalism” – that is bringing
the crisis to a head.Cognitive capitalism constitutes an economic aswell as a social
apocalypse of the virtualization process, the beginnings of which antedate elec-
tronic media by two and a half millennia. The overarching philosophical dilemma
we have dubbed the “crisis of representation” is centered on the technical issue of
hypomnesis, or the exteriorization of memory, Plato identified in the Phaedrus as
the danger posed by writing. Plato!s preoccupation was the loss of direct access to
the real, a position Derrida in Of Grammatology characterized as “ontotheo-
logical”.
Writing, Plato insists in the latter section of the Phaedrus, is anti-philosophical
because it offers us “learning rather than wisdom” (sofi´a& de` toi˜& maqhtai˜&
do´xan)29, and philosophy is of course the pursuit of the latter. Such “learning” is
mere “semblance” (doxa), and even though it provides expanding opportunities
for the elaboration of new discursive connections, it fosters an amnesia of the
thing itself, as Heidegger was fond of pointing out, through the production of
incessant re-presentations (or if we wish instead to use Baudrillard!s terminology,
we can say the “precession of simulacra”. Such re-presentations are, if we want to
use a current clich*, a form of “fake presence.” And it is “presence”, or ousia, in
the Platonic tradition that constitutes the authentic object sought through phil-
osophical inquiry. Stiegler, a student of Derrida who in turn criticized the Socratic
discomfort withwriting as a “potion” (pharmakon) that simultaneously “poisons”
the well of wisdom while “remedying” the affliction of forgetfulness ironically
seems to side with Plato. But his Platonic sympathies have little to do with a
preference for ontology. The crisis of representation derives from the manner in
which “learning” (mathesis), or the spatio-temporal coding and archiving of what
was once knowledge by acquaintance, comes to reify the hypomnetic process as
the human essence itself.
Thus the invention of “writing,” which by Stiegler!s reckoning is but a con-
venient trope for hypomnesis as a whole encompassing everything from symbolic
logic to electronic bits and bytes, sets inmotion an historical juggernaut careening
toward a “transhuman” future.Hypomnesis is whatwe reallymean by “capital” as
a rendering of Marx!s “alienated labor”, and it threatens to eclipse us all as
“artificially” intelligent machines that not only eliminate jobs, but even human
intimacy (think the latest, uncannily human “sexbots” that are creeping into the
market). The difference between “wisdom” (sophia) and “learning”, or “science”
(mathesis), is what Stiegler calls savoir faire versus savoir vivre. Science and
technology furnish only “know-how” (savoir-faire), engendered fromexperiences
28 Stiegler, For A New Critique of Political Economy, 4.
29 Plato, Phaedrus, 275a.
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brought about through manipulation of the human environment using symbolic
tokens and apparatuses.
Relying on terminology harking back to Edmund Husserl, Stiegler refers to
this mode of sign-production as “tertiary retention.” Tertiary retention is the key
to hypoamnesis, because it gives impetus to a wider process Stiegler dubs
“grammatization,” a convoluted but inexorable and irrepressible historical
movement for which the development of writing is only the first instantiation. In
other words, grammatization, which encompasses everything from manuscripts
and their dissemination to the evenmore sophisticated use of numbers and formal
protocols for ciphering equivalencies to abstract reasoning on the part of both
homo sapiens and computing machinery, consists in the commodification of truth
itself. The commodification of labor, asMarx understood it, ismerely onemoment
in the unfolding of amuch greater and consequential trendline. “Alienated labor”
is simply a harbinger of the eventual extinction of what it means to be human,
which relies on savoir vivre, “knowing how to live.” A genuine “critique of po-
litical economy,” for Stiegler, cannot be separated from the critique of human
knowledge overall.
Stiegler insists that this extreme stage of alienation conceals a genuine crisis of
capitalism. We might add that it appears as well to be the watermark of neo-
liberalism itself. “The capitalist economy strictly speaking no longer works,”
Stiegler contends, “because it wants the psychic individualism to be self-detected,
to become the #entrepreneur of the self!, without collective individuation, but
rather through a collective disindividuation orchestrated by marketing,” which
Stiegler writes includes both the so-called “conservative revolution” of 1980s and
the present post-millennial phase of global, corporate neoliberalism.30The notion
that contemporary culture is a form of self-entrepreneurship whereby our alien-
ated self-knowledge now becomes a kind of high-octane fuel that powers the
capacious neoliberalmodus operandi, of course, can be attributed toBrown in her
Undoing the Demos. Brown is the first to recognize that neoliberalism is not
merely a tendentious set of economic principles, but “a form of normative reason
remaking the state, society, and subject, generating social policy, positing truth
and a theory of law.” It is, in effect, “a revolutionary and comprehensive political
rationality, one that draw on classical liberal language and concerns while in-
verting many of liberalism!s purpose and channels of accountability.”31 Brown
stresses that neoliberalism subtly stands on its head the classical liberal values
emphasizing personal freedom by summoning such grandiloquence to perform
the task of constraining the social agent to the unfreedom of self-entrepreneurship
in the name of the vast, collective good – what she terms “responsibilism.” Re-
sponsibilismnever prescribes an objective, person, or idea towhich is nevertheless
always “responsible.”One can never do enough, because there is always infinitely
30 Stiegler, For A New Critique of Political Economy, 61–62.
31 Brown, Undoing the Demos, 69.
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more to do. Responsibility is unbounded; it is forever committed to an im-
perceptible “elsewhere.”
6. Cognitive Capitalism and the Crisis of Neoliberal Hegemony
The idolatry of cognitive capitalism, which seduces both of our instincts for self-
validation and helping others, is founded on an ethic of “knowledge, thought, and
training” that are “valued and desired for their contribution of capital enhance-
ment.”32 It should be noted that contrary to latter day sentimentality of today!s
“Bohemian bourgeoisie” that is fond of parroting Marxist slogans from the cu-
bicle of a tech firmoffering exorbitant salaries and benefits, or from the comfort of
an oak-paneled university office where “revolutionary” ideology is not matched
by the commitment to taking authentic political risks, the real neoliberal power
complex is no longer vested in the likes of neither Ebenezer Scrooge, the Koch
Brothers, nor even the legendary “military industrial complex”. Instead it accrues
to the captains of the new “knowledge industries”, allied with intelligence
agencies and vast, government bureaucracies, who leverage the infrastructure of
electronic communications networks more and more to manage and regulate the
contents of information flow and their formatting into usable snippets of insight.
The newplanetary space of cognitive capitalism (it is actually, he insinuates rather
cryptically a type of “mafia capitalism”), according to Stiegler, becomes a vast
desert of “pure calculable exchange” wearing the deceptive mask of “socially
conscious” enterprise. It becomes a type of transnational, postmodern, post-
Christian secular “supergo”, as Emmett Rensin has called it33, that exploits in its
own unique style the consumerist “will to nothingness,” as Nietzsche would have
described it.
Stiegler is not, however, an unrepentant pessimist. LikeMarx, he offers his own
eschatological vision, which we will explore in some of the passages that follow.
But what is missing in Stiegler – and to a large degree in the growing chorus of
critics as well as diagnosticians of the deeper “logic” of neoliberalism – is the way
in which this novel type of “political rationality” is driven by and large by medi-
atization itself. In other words, how does Agamben!s mediatic “glory” alchemize
into the basest illustration of the “tawdry”? In order to answer that question, we
must examine another core concept of Stiegler!s, what he in a very plain-spoken
manner identifies as “stupidity” (bÞtise)34.
32 Brown, Undoing the Demos, 177.
33 Emmett Rensin, The Blathering Superego at the End of History.
34 The French word bÞtise, which Stiegler strategically employs, can also be translated
as “brutishness”, “senselessness”, or even “foolishness”, depending on the context.
Stiegler wants to drive home that is a condition of the latemodern era that does not call in
an obvious sense for moral opprobrium, but is a kind of fatuousness that can precipitate
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Stiegler views his calling as a renewal of the task defined by Horkheimer and
Adorno inTheDialectic of Enlightenment and detailed at the height of the Second
World War, that of courageously investigating how the Age of Reason had met-
astasized into the pseudo-politics of totalitarianism, where “public life has
reached a state inwhich thought is being turned inescapably into a commodity and
language into celebration of the commodity.”35 The commodification of thought
and language, for Stiegler, is farmore complicated thanwhat the Frankfurt School
interpreted as the descent of reason into unreason, the “reversion” of logos to
mythos, as manipulated cunningly through fascist propaganda. It is the baleful
outcome of the triumph in all spheres of hypomnesic technology and its very
“interiorization” in both conscious and unconscious life. “What is occurring, on a
scale and in conditions that were hitherto inconceivable,” Stiegler writes, “is the
effect of what Gramsci described as a cultural hegemony that de-forms reason –
reason understood in Enlightenment terms as that historical and social conquest
that now seems to decompose so rapidly into rationalization.”36
In his Prison Writings from 1929–35 Gramsci himself had foreseen this evo-
lution with his observation that Hegel!s “ethical state” as the embodiment of
moral and cultural reason (favored by liberal democrats) had fallen victim to the
same kind of “fetishism” thatMarx ascribed to the logic of commodification. This
fetishism marks usurpation of what Gramsci called the “philosophy of praxis” by
the cultural and linguistic apparatus exercised through popular communication
techniques appropriated by the rising class. Writing at that juncture in the history
of Europe when fascism had supplanted class consciousness with what the
Frankfurt School had recognized as a hostile takeover of the collective uncon-
scious under the sway of the “culture industry”, Gramsci discerned that hegem-
onic relations in twentieth century society were neither political nor economic so
much as they were semiotic. In that respect Gramsci was the one, long before
Stiegler, to cognize how any “revolutionary” seizure of the means of production
could not be separated from the means of culture production. Moreover, such a
ghastly results, as implied in Hannah Arendt!s celebrated expression “the banality of
evil.” Stiegler draws to a certain extent on Derrida!s critique of Agamben in his final
lecture series around the question of “what lives?”, where the totalitarian politics of
“bare life” profiled by Agamben in Homo Sacer is re-imagined as the transformation of
the politics of experience (savoir vivre) into an automatism of the abstracted subject,
where “living” (vivant) substance becomes an empty “set with no other unity.” See
Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, trans. Geoffrey Bennington, vol. ii (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 8.
35 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philo-
sophical Fragments, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press,
2002), xiv.
36 Bernard Stiegler, States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century
(Hoboken NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), Kindle edition, loc. 817–820).
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seizure, if it were possible at all, would have to depend on a new kind of com-
municative internationale, who through a universal dictatorship of the cognitive
proletariat would would upend the system of semiotic control in accordance with
which Foucaultean biopower resolves itself into the most insidious subterfuges of
logopower. “Every relationship of #hegemony!”, Gramsci contends, “is necessa-
rily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the
various forces that comprise it […] in the entire international and world field.”37
It is significant that Gramsci alluded in his notebooks to the emerging he-
gemonic role of journalism, which he characterized as a contingent of “pocket-
geniuses”, which pretends to be “holding the whole of history in the palm of its
hand.”38 But Gramsci was naturally unable to anticipate the digitization of both
news and entertainment media where the “manufacture of consent” was boosted
exponentially by an explosion, if not the amalgamation, of digital communication
and commerce, especially what we now know as “social media”. In social media
Stiegler!s “tertiary retention” desiccates not only lived experience, but the spiri-
tual fabric of human relationships, an electronic bellum omnium contra omnes
that has become the strange and eminently hostile “twittering” virtual universe
we know as politics in this day and age. The demos that has been “undone” by this
global apotheosis of grammatization and mediatization (by a proliferation of not
only “fake news” but “fake agencies” of the electronic sort that cull, peddle, and
feature what we are supposed to know through marketizing algorithms and hy-
perbots that exercise their own seamless, yet invisible control over the new
“symbolic milieu” (Stiegler).
Stiegler himself calls for an insurrection against this pervasive alien dominion
of a machinic “deep state” that might be fomented somehow through a recovery
of the intimacy of wisdom itself, the wisdom of the body, of classicalmnemosyne,
of philosophy as the philia of sophia, something akin to Alain Badiou!s notion of
love itself as a revolutionary praxis, or “truth procedure.” Such an insurrection
requires the severance, according to Stiegler, of “the interface between the
technical system and social systems” and the “economic system.” The upshot
would be what he calls l!(conomie de contribution (“the economy of con-
tribution”), which unfortunately he does not specify in any detail. Knowledge
must be valued for its own sake, or at least for social flourishing. Such a society
would be anti-consumerist. In an interview with a representative of the Macif
Foundation, Stiegler comments:
“This model [of the society of contribution] rests on investment and citizens taking
responsibility. It differs from Fordism because it depends on de-prolaterisation (sic). For
Marx, the workers are proletarized when their expertise is replaced by the machines that
37 Antonio Gramsci, Further Selections From The Prison Notebooks (Minneapolis
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2015) Kindle edition, loc. 3822–3823.
38 Gramsci, Selections From The Prison Notebooks, loc. 10500–10501.
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they serve. In the 20th century it was the consumerswhowere proletarized andwe lost the
old knowledge. Proleterization isn!t financial poverty, but the loss of knowledge. Con-
sumers do not produce their own way of living, which is now prescribed by the big
corporate names.”39
Although Stiegler!s solution sounds vague and not a little utopian – and certainly
does not have the “critical” transformational perspective we would expect per-
haps from such incisive social and political theorizing – it steers us in a direction
from which the broader critique of neoliberalism often shies away.
The crisis of neoliberal hegemony comes down to a crisis of liberal democracy
stemming from the crisis of representation that can be tracked all the way back to
the end of the Aufklärung. It is a hollowing out of the political, caused by the
passage of dialectic into a highly undialectical planetary economism of alge-
brarically codified and commodified desire.The same process is spurred on by the
sophisms of marketing (in contradistinction to the production of exchange values
on the market itself), where the sublimation of drives in the traditional Weberian
analysis is transmuted into what Herbert Marcuse called “repressive desu-
blimation”, according to which “the progress of technological rationality is liq-
uidating the oppositional and transcending elements in the #higher culture.!”40
The fundamental challenge of the new era is to recapture the sense of “real
presence” in both our language in our social relations, and in our politics.
References
Adorno, Theodor / Horkheimer, Max: Dialectic of Enlightenment, Philosophical Frag-
ments, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2002.
Agamben, Giorgio: The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of
Economy and Government, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini, Stanford
CA: Stanford University Press, Kindle Edition, 2011.
Brown, Wendy: Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism!s Stealth Revolution, New York:
Zone Books, 2015.
Cain, Andrew: The Power of Religion in Late Antiquity, New York: Routledge, 2009.
Derrida, Jacques: The Beast and the Sovereign, trans. Geoffrey Bennington, vol. ii,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
Flynn, Jeffrey: “Communicative Power in Habermas! Theory of Democracy”, in: Eu-
ropean Journal of Political Theory 3(4).
Foucault,Michel:Power/Knowledge: Selected InterviewsAndOtherWritings, NewYork:
Vintage, 1980.
Goodchild, Philip: Theology of Money, Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2009.
39 Mariannetranslates, Bernard Stiegler and the Economy of Contribution.
40 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (London: Sphere Books, 1968), 75.
59
Neoliberal Hegemony and the “Undoing” of the Demos
Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Goux, Jean-Joseph: Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud, Ithaca, NY: Columbia
University Press, 1990.
Gramsci, Antonio: Further Selections From The Prison Notebooks, Minneapolis MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 2015, Kindle edition.
Gramsci, Antonio: Selections From The Prison Notebooks, New York: International
Publishers, 1992, Kindle edition.
Habermas, Jürgen: Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of
Law and Democracy, tr. William Rehg, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.
Lashier, Jackson J.: The Trinitarian Theology of Irenaeus of Lyons, unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Marquette University, May 2011.
Lazzarato, Maurizio: “Immaterial Labor” in: Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential
Politics, ed. Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt, Minneapolis MN: University of Min-
nesota Press, 2006.
Leshem, Dotan: The Origins of Neoliberalism: Modelling the Economy from Jesus to
Foucault, New York: Columbia University Press, 2016.
Marcuse, Herbert: One-Dimensional Man, London: Sphere Books, 1968, 75.
Marx, Karl: Capital, Book 1, 6.
Plato: Phaedrus.
Plato: Republic.
Raschke, Carl: Force of God, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.
Rives, James B.: Religion in the Roman Empire, Hoboken NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques: The Works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract,
Confessions, Emile, and Other Essays, Baltimore MD: Common Knowledge Pub-
lishers, 2004, Kindle Edition, locations.
Singh, Devin: Divine Currency: The Theological Power of Money in theWest, Stanford
CA: Stanford University Press, 2018.
Stiegler, Bernard: For A New Critique of Political Economy, trans. David Ross, New
York: Polity, 2010.
Stiegler, Bernard: States of Shock: Stupidity andKnowledge in the 21st Century, Hoboken
NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2015, Kindle edition.
Internet Sources
Mariannetranslates: Bernard Stiegler and the Economy of Contribution, https://ma
riannetranslates.wordpress.com/2013/01/04/bernard-Stiegler-and-the-economy-of-
contribution/ [accessed June 20th, 2017], English translation from the French inter-
view:Les gens consomment plus parce qu!ils id(alisent demoins enmoins, http://www.
fondation-macif.org/bernard-stiegler-les-gens-consomment-plus-parce-quils-ideal
isent-de-moins-en-moins [June 20th, 2017].
Rensin, Emmett: The Blathering Superego at the End of History, Los Angeles Review of
Books, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/the-blathering-superego-at-the-end-of-his
tory/#, [June 19th, 2017].
Carl Raschke, College of Arts, Humanities & Social Sciences, Department of Religious
Studies, University of Denver, Denver CO 80208, USA, e-mail: carlraschke@gmail.com
60
Carl Raschke
Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Citation: Raschke, Carl: “The Kingdom, the Power, the Glory, and the Tawdry: Neo-
liberal Hegemony and the “Undoing” of the Demos”, in: Appel, Kurt / Raschke, Carl
(eds.): The Crisis of Representation (J-RaT 2018 / 2) pp. 40–61.
Datum der Publikation: 21.01.2019
61
Neoliberal Hegemony and the “Undoing” of the Demos
Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
